Malicious Prosecution

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Malicious Prosecution

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  1. Abuse of Process
  2. Attorneys’ Fees
  3. Attorneys’ Fees: Against Government

  4. Confidentiality: Informants
  5. Conflicts of Interest — Legal Representation

  6. Counterclaims
  7. Crime Victim’s Rights
  8. Damages: Compensatory
  9. Damages: Punitive Government
  10. Damages: Punitive Individual
  11. Damages: Statutory Cap
  12. Damages: Survival of Action
  13. Defamation
  14. Defenses: Absolute Immunity
  15. Defenses: Absolute Judicial Immunity

  16. Defenses: Abstention
  17. Defenses: Assumption of Risk

  18. Defenses: Collateral Estoppel & Judicial Estoppel

  19. Defenses: Eleventh Amendment
  20. Defenses: Fugitive Disentitlement
  21. Defenses: Governmental Immunity

  22. Defenses: Indemnification
  23. Defenses: Individual
  24. Defenses: Issue Preclusion

  25. Defenses: Jurisdiction
  26. Defenses: Official Immunity
  27. Defenses: Privilege/Immunity
  28. Defenses: Qualified Immunity
  29. Due Process

  30. Emotional Distress
  31. Extradition
  32. Failure to Disclose Evidence, & Loss of Evidence/Preservation of Evidence
  33. False Arrest/Imprisonment: Computer Assisted

  34. False Arrest/Imprisonment: From Private Citizens

  35. False Arrest/Imprisonment: No Warrant
  36. False Arrest/Imprisonment: Unlawful Detention
  37. False Arrest/Imprisonment: Warrant

  38. Federal Tort Claims Act
  39. First Amendment
  40. Force
  41. Forfeiture Proceedings
  42. Freedom of Information
  43. Governmental Liability: Federal Government
  44. Governmental Liability: Indemnity
  45. Governmental Liability: Local Government
  46. Governmental Liability: Policy/Custom
  47. Governmental Liability: Sheriffs/Constables
  48. Governmental Liability: State Government
  49. Governmental Liability: Supervision
  50. Governmental Liability: Training
  51. Injunctive Relief
  52. Investigatory Stops
  53. Malicious Prosecution
  54. Negligence: Comparative
  55. Negligence: Dead Body Identification/Handling
  56. Off Duty/Color of Law: Arrest Related
  57. Off Duty/Color of Law: Assault and Battery
  58. Off Duty/Color of Law: Firearms Related
  59. Off Duty/Color of Law: Moonlighting
  60. Off Duty/Color of Law: Personal Action
  61. Off Duty/Color of Law: Supervisory Liability
  62. Off Duty/Color of Law: Vehicle Related
  63. Other Misconduct: Access to Courts
  64. Other Misconduct: Conspiracy
  65. Other Misconduct: Conversion
  66. Other Misconduct: Eviction
  67. Other Misconduct: Fabrication of Evidence
  68. Other Misconduct: Foreign Arrestess
  69. Other Misconduct: Harassment
  70. Other Misconduct: Outrageous Conduct
  71. Other Misconduct: Lineups
  72. Other Misconduct: Property Sale
  73. Other Misconduct: Punishment of Detainees
  74. Other Misconduct: Racial – Section 1981
  75. Other Misconduct: Retaliatory Investigation
  76. Perjury
  77. P
  78. Prisoner’s Lawsuits
  79. Privacy
  80. Procedural: Amendment of Complaint
  81. Procedural: Appeal
  82. Procedural: Burden of Proof
  83. Procedural: Class Action
  84. Procedural: Cross-Examination
  85. Procedural: Discovery
  86. Procedural: Evidence
  87. Procedural: Failure to Prosecute
  88. Procedural: Judicial Estoppel
  89. Procedural: Jury Selection & Jury Trial Right
  90. Procedural: Pleading
  91. Procedural: Police Records/Reports
  92. Procedural: Psychiatric Evaluation
  93. Procedural: Removal
  94. Procedural: Section 1983 in General
  95. Procedural: Separate Trials
  96. Procedural: Summary Judgment
  97. Procedural: Venue
  98. P
  99. RICO
  100. U.S. Supreme Court Cases

United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.


Aurelio Cervantes MORALES, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation, Antonia Dimarco-Serna, an individual, Bennie Boatwright, an individual, Stan Nelson, an individual, Gregory D. Beckley, an individual, John Chavez, an individual, Defendants-Appellees.

Guadalupe Medrano, Amparo Medrano, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. City of Los Angeles, William Hall, Robert Seeman, Don S. Anderson, Rodolfo Romero, Donnelly Mallory, Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 98-56478, 99-55431.

Argued and Submitted March 8, 2000. — June 12, 2000

Before:  FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Donald W. Cook, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.Katherine J. Hamilton, Assistant City Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for the defendants-appellees.

The plaintiffs allege in this action that police perjury and other misconduct occurring in a previous civil rights lawsuit caused them to lose that case, thus depriving them of their due process right of access to the courts.   This issue today concerns the statute of limitations.   When does such a cause of action accrue?   Does the statute of limitations begin to run when the plaintiffs lose their case in the trial court and have judgment entered against them?   Or is it upon the unsuccessful exhaustion of all appeals of that judgment?   We hold that it is the former, i.e., when a final judgment is entered in the trial court.   We also hold, however, that under California law, the statute of limitations is tolled from the date of the filing of the notice of appeal until the date the appeal becomes final.

I. Background

A. The Medrano Case

The Medranos filed their first lawsuit in federal court alleging denial of their federal civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   These claims centered around plaintiffs’ allegations that Los Angeles Police Department officers wrongfully killed their son, Ruben.   After the case bounced from the district court to this court and eventually to state court, the Medranos lost at trial.   On June 20, 1995, a Los Angeles jury returned a verdict in favor of all of the defendants.   The state court entered judgment on June 21, 1995, and the Medranos appealed on August 17, 1995.   The California Court of Appeal affirmed.   On July 9, 1997, the California Supreme Court denied review.

On July 9, 1998, the Medranos filed a second civil rights lawsuit, also in federal district court, alleging that the police officers violated the Medranos’ right to access to the courts by conspiring to conceal the true nature of the shooting to defeat the Medranos’ first civil rights lawsuit.   The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations and requested that the district court take judicial notice of the judgment entered in the first action.   The district court granted both the motion for judicial notice and the motion to dismiss.   In so ruling, the court held that plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued by no later than June 20, 1995, the date on which the state jury returned its verdict adverse to the plaintiff.   Applying the one-year statute of limitations, the court thus held that this action, filed over three years later, was time-barred.

B. The Morales Case

In 1989, Morales was arrested by Los Angeles police officers and charged with sale of cocaine.   At a jury trial, he was acquitted.   Thereafter, on November 27, 1990, Morales filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California law in Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging that L.A.P.D. officers falsified police reports and records in an effort wrongfully to secure his conviction.   On April 4, 1995, the trial court granted a motion for non-suit and entered judgment for the defendants.   The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion.   The California Supreme Court denied review on February 3, 1998.

On May 20, 1998, Morales filed a second civil rights action, this time in federal court, alleging that the police officers falsely arrested him, fabricated a police report, destroyed records, and testified falsely at the state civil trial that ended in the non-suit on April 4, 1995.   Morales alleged that these actions violated his due process right to access to the courts and California state law.

Defendants filed a motion for judicial notice of the earlier state court judgment and moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to file the action within the period of the statute of limitations.   The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the one-year limitations period began to run on April 4, 1995, the date on which the Los Angeles County Superior Court entered judgment against Morales, and consequently, that the complaint filed on May 20, 1998, was time-barred.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review both Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo.   We accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.  Tworivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.1999).   The district court may grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds “ ‘only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.’ ”  Id.,(quoting Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir.1991)).

II. Statute of Limitations

A. Accrual

Actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions.   Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985);  Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1117, 120 S.Ct. 1979, 146 L.Ed.2d 808 (2000).   The one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions set forth in Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340 applies to § 1983 actions filed in California.   Del Percio v. Thornsley, 877 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir.1989).   Although state law determines the length of the limitations period, federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues.  Tworivers, 174 F.3d at 991.   As we said in Tworivers, “[u]nder federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”  Id. The primary question, then, is when did these plaintiffs know or have reason to know of the injury of which they complain?

The plaintiffs in both cases allege that police misconduct caused them wrongfully to lose their earlier lawsuits.   The plaintiffs argue “it’s not over ‘til it’s over” and that they didn’t know that they truly had lost their case until they had exhausted their appeals.   They reason that, had they prevailed on appeal, they wouldn’t have suffered the injury that gives rise to their damages.

The defendants, on the other hands, argue that the plaintiffs first knew or had reason to know that they lost their lawsuits when they lost their lawsuits, not when the losses were subsequently upheld on appeal.   They argue that it is knowledge of having been caused injury, not subsequent judicial verification of the injury, that starts the running of the statute of limitations.   This argument derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), in which the Court held that the limitations period in a Title VII action began to run on the date that the plaintiff was first notified of the denial of tenure, not the date of the eventual loss of his teaching position.   The Court said, “ ‘the proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.’ ”  Id. (quoting Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir.1979)).

Although we have not considered this precise issue before, the Second Circuit has.   In Veal v. Geraci, 23 F.3d 722 (2d Cir.1994), the plaintiff was convicted and sentenced to prison on June 22, 1988, for robbery and larceny.   In 1990, his conviction was reversed on appeal.   On March 27, 1992, the plaintiff brought his § 1983 lawsuit for damages alleging that his due process rights were violated when he was subjected to a tainted lineup that caused his conviction.   A three-year statute of limitations applied;  the issue was when did it began to run.  Id. at 724.   The Second Circuit held that Veal’s cause of action accrued “no later than June 22, 1988, when Veal was sentenced for the crimes of which he was convicted with the aid of that identification.”  Id. at 726.   That is the date on which he knew or had reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.

The reference to “know[ledge] of the injury” does not suggest that the statute does not begin to run until the claimant has received judicial verification that the defendant’s acts were wrongful.   Rather, the claim accrues when the alleged conduct has caused the claimant harm and the claimant knows or has reason to know of the allegedly impermissible conduct and the resulting harm.

Id. at 724 (citations omitted).

We agree with this approach.   Morales’s and the Medranos’ causes of action accrued when the alleged police misconduct resulted in judgments being entered against them.   At that point, they knew or had reason to know that the alleged misconduct actually caused concrete injury.1 The possibility that a subsequent appellate reversal of the judgments might moot the cause of action does not affect the analysis.   Accrual and mootness principles operate independently of each other.

We also note that our decisions in Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1015, 119 S.Ct. 538, 142 L.Ed.2d 448 (1998), and Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t., 839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir.1988), are not at all inconsistent with our conclusion today.   In both Delew and Karim-Panahi, the plaintiffs brought denial-of-access-to-the-courts claims arising from alleged police misconduct occurring in on-going state trial court proceedings.   We held that such claims are not ripe until the trial court proceedings are concluded adversely to the plaintiffs.   Delew, 143 F.3d at 1223;  Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 625.

B. Tolling

We next consider whether the limitations period is tolled while the adverse judgment is appealed.  Tworivers, 174 F.3d at 991.   Because we borrow the California state statute of limitations, we also apply California’s tolling rules that are not inconsistent with federal law.   Fink, 192 F.3d at 914.   Both the Medranos and Morales argue that the California tolling principles in malicious prosecution cases should be applied to this case because the causes of action are similar in one respect:  neither cause of action exists until an underlying judgment has been entered by a court.   Under California law, a malicious prosecution claim accrues on the date that the trial court enters judgment.   The statute of limitations is then tolled during an appeal from the judgment.  Gibbs v. Haight, Dickson, Brown & Bonesteel, 183 Cal.App.3d 716, 228 Cal.Rptr. 398, 402 (1986).   However, the time between the filing of the judgment and filing of the notice of appeal is not tolled.  Id. In other words, the limitations period begins to run on the date of judgment, is tolled from the date the notice of appeal is filed, and begins to run again when the state appellate court issues a remittitur.2 Rare Coin Galleries, Inc., v. A-Mark Coin Co., 202 Cal.App.3d 330, 248 Cal.Rptr. 341, 344 (1988).

We agree that California’s tolling rule applies in these cases.   It is not inconsistent with federal law.   It also has the advantage of promoting judicial economy in that it encourages plaintiffs to wait for the appellate proceedings in the underlying case to fully run their course before initiating a denial-of-access-to-the-courts lawsuit.   As previously noted, the reversal of the adverse judgment would moot such a claim.  Delew, 143 F.3d at 1222-23;  Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 625.

III. Conclusion

Because neither record contains the exact dates that the remittiturs were filed by the California Court of Appeal or, in Morales, the date the notice of appeal was filed, we cannot precisely apply these principles to the cases at hand.   Both cases are REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this decision.3


1.   In the Medrano case, the district court ruled that the cause of action accrued on the date the verdict was returned.   Because district court proceedings are not final until the judgment is entered, we hold that the date of entry of judgment, not the date of verdict, begins the running of the limitations period.

2.   In California procedure, a remittitur is analogous to the mandate in federal appellate practice.  Rare Coin, 248 Cal.Rptr. at 344.

3.   These cases were consolidated for the sole purpose of appellate argument and decision and are now severed for all other purposes.

Defenses: Statute of Limitations

A former inmate, released from custody after he was exonerated of a murder that he had previously been convicted of, filed a lawsuit asserting claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotion distress. He claimed that his conviction was caused by a number of acts of police misconduct, including the threatening of witnesses and the fabricating of evidence. All claims were dismissed as time-barred, under the theory that they accrued at the time of his arrest, rather than when he was exonerated. Reversing this result as to the emotional distress claim, a federal appeals court found that the emotional distress claim was not complete at the time of his arrest, but rather at the time of his conviction. The conviction had led to the emotional strain and mental anguish the plaintiff suffered, and this claim was therefore not time barred under the statute of limitations. Parish v. City of Elkhart, #09-2056, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 15747 (7th Cir.).
A motorist sought to assert a claim for unlawful racial profiling–selective law enforcement by a New Jersey state trooper. The plaintiff was a native of Colombia, and the two passengers in his vehicle were Hispanic. He was stopped by the trooper for alleged speeding and during the stop, the trooper noticed that a passenger had a white powdery substance in his mustache, causing the trooper to request consent to search the car, which was granted, leading to the finding of cocaine in the vehicle, and the motorist’s arrest by a second trooper who arrived on the scene. The motorist was convicted on the drug charges nine years later, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Almost three years later, however, the state moved to vacate his conviction, stating that “colorable issues of racial profiling” existed at the time of arrest. Approximately a year and a half later, or fourteen years after the initial arrest, the motorist sued, asserting claims for false arrest and selective enforcement. Holding that the motorist’s claims were time barred, a federal appeals court found that the motorist did not have to wait until his conviction was overturned to bring his lawsuit, since his claim for selective enforcement, in particular, did not necessarily depend on the invalidity of his conviction. But his claim did not accrue until he was aware of facts indicating racial profiling and selective enforcement. In this case, that was at least by July of 2001, when his attorney became aware of extensive documents describing the state’s alleged selective enforcement practices. Since it was over two years later that the plaintiff filed his lawsuit, his claims were time barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Dique v. New Jersey State Police, #05-1159, 603 F.3d 181 (3rd Cir. 2010).
A nightclub stated viable claims for violation of Fourth Amendment rights in alleging that officers entered the premises without a warrant, without probable cause, and for the purpose of investigating possible drug use there, frisking patrons, handcuffing a number of them without making arrests, ordering lights turned on at the club, and generally acting in an “intimidating” way. Claims related to an earlier incident at the club were time barred as the lawsuit was filed four days after the applicable two-year statute of limitations expired. The Illusions of the South, Inc. v. City of Valdosta, #7:07-cv-6, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27154 (M.D. Ga.).
False arrest lawsuit filed almost four years after a conviction for possessing a stolen car was set aside was time-barred by a two year Illinois statute of limitations. Prosecutors in the case were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Gordon v. Devine, No. 08C377, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 81234 (N.D. Ill.).
When a police department seized handguns in 1996 following a suicide, the decedent also left a note specifying who he wanted to have the weapons, a person subsequently named as the co-personal representative of his estate. One of the weapons was released to someone claiming ownership, and the others were destroyed in 2003 on the basis that they were unclaimed property. The estate representative only filed a claim for the guns in 2005, and she filed a federal lawsuit in 2008, claiming that the police department breached a duty to notify her concerning the disposition of the weapons. The court ruled that her claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations, and that any “tolling” (extension” of the time limit would only have applied until the time when she first had the ability to file a claim on behalf of the estate, following her appointment in 2000. Stone v. Whitman, Civil Action No. 07-cv-01611, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 69178 (D. Colo.).
A man convicted of a sexual assault, and exonerated when DNA proved that the semen found on the victim’s underwear was not his, presented evidence sufficient to support a jury’s verdict in his favor against a police officer for allegedly violating his due process right by tampering with or manipulating testimonial evidence and identification, causing his trial to be unfair. His claim was not time barred because his right to sue for malicious prosecution only arose after his criminal conviction was set aside. The Plaintiff was awarded $9,063,000 against the officer, a judgment for which the city was required to indemnify him. Dominguez v. Hendley, No. 07-1004, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 20577 (7th Cir.).
Most of the plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims were time barred by a New Mexico three-year statute of limitations when they arose out of his arrest, detention, interrogation and release, and he filed his lawsuit more than three years after his release. The court also found that one defendant, the former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, was entitled to sovereign immunity on civil rights claims against him. The plaintiff also did not have standing to assert claims for the alleged monitoring of other library patrons’ use of computers, which were the only claims not time barred. O’Connor v. St. John’s College, No. 07-2225, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 17730 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
The retention of property by police, which was seized as part of a criminal fraud investigation, did not constitute a “continuing violation” extending the applicable statute of limitations on a federal civil rights claim. The applicable statute of limitations began to run when the property was seized, and the lawsuit was time barred by a three-year statute of limitations, entitling the defendants to summary judgment. Herrin v. Dunham, No. 05-10245, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 55859 (E.D. Mich.).
Twenty years after an arrestee was convicted of assault, rape, and robbery, a medical examiner determined, from evidence in a rape kit, that he was innocent of these offenses. Because the arrestee had presented an alibi and there was a lack of physical evidence linking him to the incident, the court ruled that his claim that police officers and prosecutors pressured eyewitnesses into making false identifications, failed to produce the rape kit and other exculpatory evidence, and failed to investigate a suspect named by the victim was sufficient to present a claim that they acted in bad faith. The plaintiff could proceed with his malicious prosecution claims, and any claims concerning the rape kit were not time-barred because of the defendants’ alleged deliberate deception in falsely stating that they searched for, but did not find, the rape kit. Newton v. City of New York, No. 07 Civ. 6211, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 54084 (S.D.N.Y.).
An arrestee’s lawsuit over being shot during the arrest was barred by a Texas two-year statute of limitations. A doctor’s letter stating that the plaintiff suffered from depression and anxiety was insufficient to show that the plaintiff was of “unsound mind” continuously and therefore should have the statute of limitations tolled (extended). Aduddle v. Body, No. 07-20190, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 9745 (5th Cir.).
An arrest and the shooting of the arrestee occurred in 1998, so that any lawsuit filed over the incident was time-barred by Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations, and was properly dismissed when it was not filled until 2002. No “tolling” (extension) of the time period was justified, since the arrestee stated that he was conscious “before, during, and after” the time he was shot, and that he took the position, at the time of the incident, that he had been deliberately shot by the officer without provocation, allegedly in order to “cover up” the shooting officer’s accidental shooting of a fellow officer during the arrest. Drake v. City of Detroit, No. 06-1817, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 4224 (6th Cir.).
An arrestee who claimed in his lawsuit that he had been falsely arrestee under a warrant that had been dismissed could not pursue his claim when he failed to give the date of the purported arrest, or the date he had been arraigned, since, without that information, it could not be determined whether his lawsuit was timely. Further, the plaintiff failed to name particular defendants responsible for his alleged arrest, and improperly sought to assert claims for federal civil rights liability against the county on the basis of vicarious liability. Porto v. Camden County Freedholders, No. 07-5359, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 90855 (D.N.J.).
All claims in an arrestee’s lawsuit asserting that his rights had been violated by officers involved in his arrest, prosecution, and conviction between May 2003 and February 2004 were barred by an applicable two-year statute of limitations. Rodriguez v. Pennsylvania, No. 07-4295, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 29252 (3rd Cir.).
A lawsuit filed approximately five years after events giving rise to an arrestee’s federal civil rights claims was barred by an applicable Georgia two-year statute of limitations. Additionally, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, under the circumstances, in finding that the lawsuit was frivolous because it was time-barred. Simon v. City of Atlanta, Ga., No. 06-16269, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28967 (11th Cir.).
In a federal civil rights lawsuit by a woman raising various claims concerning the defendants’ alleged actions impacting on her custody of a minor, allegations of abuse, and her arrest and imprisonment, all of her claims involved events occurring between 2000 and 2003. Since this time period was more than two years before the filing of her lawsuit, the trial court properly found that the lawsuit should be dismissed on the basis of a Texas statute of limitations. Morgan v. State of Texas, No. 06-20839, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 24772 (5th Cir.).
Two men, now in their 40’s could not pursue their claims against the City of Los Angeles and the Boy Scouts of America concerning their alleged sexual abuse by a police officer in the 1970’s when they participated in a police department Explorer Scout program. Under a California statute, such claims must be brought before the victim’s 26th birthday, unless the defendant knew or had reason to know of the unlawful sexual conduct by an employee or agent, and failed to take “reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person.” The California Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit on statute of limitations grounds, finding that the plaintiffs failed to make specific enough allegations concerning the defendants’ knowledge of the officer’s alleged past sexual misconduct with minors to bring their case within the cited exception to the statute. Doe v. City of Los Angeles, No. S142546, 2007 Cal. Lexis 12186.
Civil rights claims arising from the plaintiff’s 1980’s arrest, prosecution, trial, and sentencing was time-barred under a Pennsylvania state two-year statute of limitations because the events at issue occurred over 20 years ago. Additionally, a false imprisonment claim was barred because the plaintiff was released from prison in March of 2003 and did not file a lawsuit until more than two years later. Hewlett v. Abraham, No. 07-1931, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18788 (3rd Cir.).
A businessman arrested for allegedly selling furniture after his license was suspended could not pursue malicious prosecution claims when he filed his lawsuit 2-1/2 years after the prosecution against him was abandoned, nor could he pursue a false arrest claim filed 3 years after his arrest. Both claims were barred by the statute of limitations. An offer by the defendants to drop the charges against him if he agreed not to sue them did not alter the result when he found out that the prosecution had already been dismissed the day after the offer was made, and, as a result, did not sign the release of claims the defendants provided. Shane v. Tracy, No. 88479, 2007 Ohio App. Lexis 3176 (8th Dist., Cuyahoga County).
Arrestee failed to prevent any viable legal theory or point to any specific facts which could alter the trial court’s decision that his lawsuit was filed after the applicable two-year statute of limitations expired, and was therefore time-barred. Watson v. James, No. 06-6350, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18012 (10th Cir.).
An arrestee’s claims for alleged unlawful detention accrued at the latest in 1996, so that claims he asserted under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 2004, were barred by a two-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C.S. § 2401(b). Feurtado v. Dunivant, No. 06-56496, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 14238 (9th Cir.).
An arrestee’s false arrest claim did not accrue under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 until the prosecution terminated in his favor, so that his lawsuit, filed one year after that was not barred by a statute of limitations. Mapes v. Bishop, No. 06-30559, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 14123 (5th Cir.).
When an arrestee was arraigned on June 7, 2002, and his federal civil rights lawsuit for false imprisonment was filed in February of 2006, his claim was time-barred under an Ohio state two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. The statute of limitations for a false imprisonment claim accrued when the false imprisonment ended, in other words, at the time that the plaintiff began to be held based on legal process, a judicial determination of probable cause, reached at the arraignment. Meadows v. Whetsel, No. 06-6211, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 12153 (10th Cir.).
Arrestee’s claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution under the Federal Tort Claims Act and for federal postal employees’ alleged violations of his federal civil rights accrued at the date that the alleged wrongful prosecution of him ended, so that they were barred by an applicable two-year statute of limitations. Braunstein v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 05-16390, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 8831 (9th Cir.).
The plaintiffs’ claims for unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment accrued at the date of their arrest, so their failure to filed their civil rights lawsuit until three years later meant that their claims were time barred under a two-year statute of limitations. The rule in Heck v. Humphrey, No. 93-6188, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) that a federal civil rights claim does not accrue until a conviction is reversed or vacated did not apply because the plaintiffs had not been convicted of anything at the time of their arrest. Kucharski v. Leveille, No. 05-73669, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19918 (E.D. Mich.).
U.S. Supreme Court rules that the statute of limitations on a federal civil rights claim for false arrest which results in a criminal prosecution starts to run on the date the arrestee is detained. Wallace v. Kato, No. 05-1240, 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007).[N/R]
The fact that the plaintiff had filed a prior lawsuit concerning the same incident did not toll (extend) the applicable statute of limitations, when the plaintiff never obtained service of process over the defendants in the prior action. Her second lawsuit, therefore, was barred by the statute of limitations, based on when it was filed. Geary v. City of Snellville, No. 06-12898, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 27611 (11th Cir.). [N/R]
While plaintiff’s claim that denial of access to physical evidence which was the basis for his murder conviction stated circumstances which might violate his constitutional rights, his claim was time-barred under a two-year statute of limitations which began to run on the date that a state court denied his request for access to the physical evidence for purposes of DNA testing. Savory v. Lyons, No. 06-1296 (7th Cir. November 29, 2006). [N/R]
Neither federal nor Illinois state law extended (tolled) the running of a two-year statute of limitations on a federal civil rights lawsuit for alleged wrongful arrest until the conclusion of criminal proceedings against the arrestee The arrestee’s false arrest claim accrued at the time of the arrest. Foryoh v. Triton College, No. 06-1626, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 24555 (7th Cir.). [N/R]
Federal civil rights lawsuit against police officer arising out of alleged harassment of plaintiffs through issuance of over 60 parking and traffic citations was barred by a state three-year statute of limitations. Olukayode v. Baltimore County, Md., No. L-04-2615, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 73147 (D. Md.). [N/R]
Common law claims for defamation, assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, and false light invasion of privacy were time-barred under a D.C. one-year statute of limitations. Rynn v. Jaffe, No. 05-2066, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 76140 (D.D.C.). [N/R]
While claims for false arrest, illegal search and excessive force accrued, for purposes of an Illinois statute of limitations, on the date of the arrest, the arrestee’s claim for malicious prosecution did not accrue until the charges against him were dropped. Foryoh v. Hannah-Porter, No. 05 C 2975, 428 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ill. 2006). [N/R]
Arrestee’s claim against officer arising out of his search and the officer’s alleged action in coercing him into signing a release allowing the videotape of the incident to be shown on television on the Fox TV show “Cops” accrued at the time of his arrest, so his claims were barred under a Kansas statute of limitations when he sued the officer more than two years later. While his claims against the television producers and network for invasion of privacy accrued later, when the program aired, he could not pursue federal civil rights claims against them, because they did not act under color of state law. Mitchell v. Langley, No. 05-3393, 172 Fed. Appx. 900 (10th Cir. 2006). [N/R]
A New Jersey two-year statute of limitations on the plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claims began to run, at the latest, on the date when a grand jury declined to indict him on the underlying criminal complaint, or the date when he learned of this or reasonably should have, so that his lawsuit, filed four years later, was time barred. Akinola v. Doe, No. 05-4454, 165 Fed. Appx. 242 (3rd Cir. 2006). [N/R]
An arrestee’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against federal prosecutors and a postal inspector under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(b), arising out of his arrest, were subject to a two year statute of limitations in New York. Levine v. Gerson, No. 05-0748, 164 Fed. Appx. 64 (2d Cir. 2006). [N/R]
A former convict who received a pardon on the basis of innocence on a rape he was arrested and prosecuted for more than 50 years earlier could pursue a number of federal civil rights claims arising out of his arrest and prosecution. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), federal civil rights claims which would necessarily show the invalidity of a conviction do not accrue until the conviction has been set aside, and the court ruled that the rule in Heck would be applied retroactively to determine whether the statute of limitations period should be tolled (extended) on such claims. Walden v. City of Chicago, No. 04C0047, 391 F. Supp. 2d 660 (N.D. Ill. 2005). [N/R]      Oregon intermediate appeals court overturns $81,260 jury award against city in lawsuit arising from alleged sexual abuse, by a police officer, of a teenager involved in a police Explorer youth program. The court found that the lawsuit was time-barred under a two-year statute of limitations and that the plaintiff’s claim accrued at the time the abuse allegedly occurred, not later when he testified before a grand jury proceeding concerning the incidents years later. Court rejects the plaintiff’s theory that it was not until the grand jury proceeding that he had enough information to know that the city may have caused his injuries by ignoring reports of the officer’s alleged abusive tendencies. T.R. v. Boy Scouts of America, No. 0206-5750, 133 P.3d 353 (Ore. App. 2006). [N/R]
In a lawsuit by man claiming a city “chilled” his First Amendment rights by gathering and filing information about his political activity as early as the late 1960s, and sharing this information with other agencies until March of 2000, his claims accrued, for purposes of a two-year Colorado statute of limitations on the date on which, based on his own admissions, he had knowledge that the files existed. His claims were therefore time-barred under the statute, when his own admissions showed that he had sufficient knowledge that the files existed by 1998, “at the latest,” and he did not file his lawsuit until 2003. Vigil v City and County of Denver, #04-1414, 162 Fed. Appx. 809 (10th Cir. 2006). [N/R]
Excessive force, unreasonable search, and invasion of privacy claims were properly dismissed as time-barred under Texas two-year statute of limitations, but false arrest and malicious prosecution claims would not accrue until criminal prosecution against arrestee terminated in his favor. These claims, therefore, were not time-barred, and might be able to be re-filed after the prosecution of the plaintiff concluded. Price v. City of San Antonio, No. 04-51213, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 26539 (5th Cir.). [2006 LR Feb]
Purported police harassment of witness who claimed to have witnessed two police officers murdering a woman was an insufficient basis for a civil RICO claim. The plaintiff’s alleged loss of employment income because of false arrest and malicious prosecution, and his expenses for attorneys’ fees to defend himself were not an injury to “business or property” as required for standing to bring a RICO lawsuit. Federal appeals court also upholds dismissal of plaintiff’s First Amendment civil rights claim and state law claims as untimely. Evans v. City of Chicago, No. 03-3844, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 264 (7th Cir.). [2006 LR Feb]
False arrest lawsuit, filed almost two years after the arrest, was time-barred under Puerto Rico’s one-year statute of limitations, which began to run from the time of the arrest. Morales v. Fantauzzi, No. Civ. 04-2255, 389 F. Supp. 2nd 147 (D. Puerto Rico. 2005). [N/R]
District of Columbia one-year statute of limitations for false arrest was “tolled” (extended) during the time the arrestee was in jail, and did not start to run until his release from custody. Fernandors v. District of Columbia, No. CIV.A.02-2001, 382 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2005). [N/R]
In a lawsuit by animal protection volunteers against employees of a government investigating commission who allegedly published defamatory material about them on a government website, the claim was time barred by a one-year New Jersey statute of limitations for defamation claims. The statute of limitations began to run on the date the material was first published on the website, and that time period was not extended by the fact that the website was subsequently updated or modified while continuing to contain the same allegedly defamatory material. Churchill v. State of New Jersey, 876 A.2d 311 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2005). [N/R]
While plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims arising out of the search of his residence were barred by Oklahoma’s two-year statute of limitations, his claims arising out of his subsequent arrest three months later, and the alleged use of excessive force against him were not time barred. Trial court erred in utilizing the date of the search as the applicable date from which all of the plaintiff’s claims accrued. Price v. Philpot, No. 04-7121, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 18050 (10th Cir.). [N/R]
Arrestee’s claim for excessive use of force during his arrest, allegedly causing problems with his hearing, was time-barred under a three-year New York statute of limitations when he failed to bring his lawsuit until ten years after the incident. The time limit began to run from the date he was allegedly beaten. Hussain v. Commissioner, No. 04-CV-2443, 368 F. Supp. 2d 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). [N/R]
Federal trial court was mistaken in dismissing a federal civil rights lawsuit as time-barred by a Kentucky one-year statute of limitations, as the lawsuit was filed within one year from the date that the plaintiff had reason to know he had a claim. Kelly v. Burks, No. 04-5692 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 14634 (6th Cir.). [N/R]
Federal civil rights claim for detective’s alleged unlawful seizure of computer from man’s apartment accrued at the time the seizure occurred, or, at the latest, when the owner learned of the seizure, and his federal civil rights lawsuit was therefore time barred under an Indiana two year statute of limitations. Holly v. Anton, No. 03-1653, 97 Fed. Appx. 39 (7th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Claims for excessive use of force during drug possession arrest accrued on the date of the arrest, even though the plaintiff claimed not to realize the permanent nature of his injuries from the officers’ alleged choking and hitting until three months later. His lawsuit, therefore, was time barred under the Ohio statute of limitations. Hodge v. City of Elyria, No. 03-3296, 126 Fed. Appx. 222 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Lawsuit asserting claims under Kansas state statute concerning legitimate procedures for strip and body cavity searches was governed by three-year statute of limitations applicable to statutory claims, rather than one-year statute of limitations governing privacy claims or two-year statute of limitations applicable to federal civil rights claims in the state. The arrestee’s lawsuit, therefore, was not time barred and was reinstated. McCormick v. City of Lawrence, No. 90,853, 104 P.3d 991 (Kan. 2005). [N/R]
While a two-year Illinois statute of limitations for personal injury cases applied to federal civil rights claims against a municipality and its police officer, a shorter one-year statute of limitations applied to state law claims against the same defendants joined with the federal civil rights lawsuit. Both federal and state law claims were time barred and were therefore properly dismissed. Williams v. Lampe, No. 04-1497, 399 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
In a lawsuit concerning the death of an Ohio resident allegedly caused by the distress the Ohio father suffered over the purported wrongful arrest of his son by California police officers, a California state six-month statute of limitations applied, rather than a two-year Ohio statute of limitations. The federal trial court, applying the California statute to the father’s federal civil rights claim, therefore properly dismissed the lawsuit as time barred. Estate of Darulis v. Garate, No. 03-16580, 401 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Liquor store owners stated a viable possible claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b) based on alleged conduct of FBI agents who allegedly passed their names on to racketeers after they reported to police that they were victims of extortion by the racketeers, resulting in damage to their businesses. The racketeers were allegedly being protected by the FBI agents as confidential informants, and the agents acted within the scope of their employment under the FTCA in taking their alleged actions. The actions did not come within the “discretionary function” exemption to the FTCA, because the agents had “no room” for the exercise of discretion under extensive FBI regulations concerning how to handle confidential informants. The claims asserted, however, were time barred under the applicable statute of limitations, so the complaint was dismissed. Rakes v. United States, No. CIV.A.02-10480, 352 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D. Mass. 2005). [N/R]
Federal trial court properly dismissed both state law and federal claims asserted by a woman concerning injuries allegedly inflicted on her by a police officer, even though the defendants failed to raise their statute of limitations defense on the original state law claims in state court until after answering an amended complaint. Federal appeals court decision discusses relationship between statutes of limitations on state and federal claims in Illinois in a case removed to federal court from state court. Williams v. Lampe, No. 04-1497 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 3430 (7th Cir.). [2005 LR Apr]
The applicable three-year statute of limitations on an attorney’s federal civil rights claim against court officers who allegedly physically assaulted him started to run on the date of the alleged assault. The fact that an allegedly “related” claim was pending in state court did not toll (extend) the three-year time period, so the complaint was properly dismissed as untimely. Keane v. Navarro, No. Civ.A.03-CV-10154, 345 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D. Mass. 2004). [N/R]
Motorist’ claim against the State of New York for state and federal constitutional violations concerning two stops during which his car and person were searched were time barred when not filed within the two-year jurisdictional time limit of the New York Court of Claims. McKinney’s Court of Claims Act, Sec. 10, sub. 3. The state was immune from these constitutional claims when not filed within two years, rather than the otherwise applicable New York statute of limitations of three years for federal constitutional claims or six years for state constitutional claims. Lyles v. State, 3 N.Y.3d 396, 820 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 2004). [N/R]
While a one-year statute of limitations applied to an arrestee’s malicious prosecution claim under Illinois law, the statute started to run not at the time criminal charges against him were first dismissed, since they could have still been reinstated, but rather at the time when a statutory speedy trial period lapsed, and the prosecutor was barred from continuing to seek to prosecute him. Ferguson v. City of Chicago, No. 97218, 820 N.E.2d 455 (Ill. 2004). [N/R]
A motion to vacate on the basis of bad faith and misconduct a prior settlement and voluntary dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim against the Missouri Highway Patrol for the alleged improper seizure and retention of cash found in his vehicle during an arrest for a drug offense had to be brought within a one-year statute of limitations for motions founded in fraud. The plaintiff’s three-year delay in bringing the motion was not reasonable, so that the motion was properly denied. Middleton v. McDonald, No. 03-3179, 388 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Statute of limitations was tolled (extended) during the time that court ordered mediation of the case was attempted. Plaintiff injured in a traffic accident with a county deputy sheriff could therefore pursue his personal injury claim even though the five-year statute of limitations had passed since the accident. Gonzalez v. County of Los Angeles, No. B168867, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. 2004). [N/R]
Motorists’ claims against individual officers that they were stopped and searched without probable cause were time-barred when they were not named as individual defendants until after the statute of limitations expired. While the city had allegedly refused to release the officers’ names to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs only filed their lawsuit one month before the statute expired, and failed to pursue discovery requests to obtain the officers’ names until seven months later, so they were not entitled to tolling (extension) of the statute of limitations. Hines v. City of Chicago, #03-1595, 91 Fed. Appx. 501 (7th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
An arrestee’s civil rights claim for coercive interrogation and torture by officers allegedly used to compel him to falsely confess to a murder did not accrue, for purposes of the statute of limitations, until his conviction was overturned. Accordingly, his claims were not time-barred. Patterson v. Burge, #03C4433, 328 F. Supp. 2d 878 (N.D. Ill. 2004). [N/R]
Lawsuit against U.S. soldiers allegedly involved in My Lai Massacre on March 16, 1968 during the Vietnam War by residents of Vietnamese village was barred by applicable statutes of limitations. Soldiers did not act under color of state law, so federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 were barred. Federal civil rights claims for direct violations of federal law under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), were barred under the four-year Utah state personal injury statute of limitations, which applied, despite the fact that the alleged misconduct occurred in Vietnam, as the federal court was not required to attempt to apply a non-existent “hypothetical” Vietnamese statute of limitations. Claims under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, were barred by a ten-year statute of limitations. International convention against the use of statutes of limitations to bar claims concerning war crimes did not apply, as the U.S. government had not adhered to that convention, and it also only applies to criminal prosecutions, and not to civil lawsuits for damages. Van Tu v. Kosters, #02-4209, 364 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Claim against sheriff for alleged unlawful arrest and confinement accrued, for statute of limitations purposes, when the plaintiff was arrested for criminal trespass, when he was never charged or prosecuted for the offense, and the plaintiff’s lawsuit was therefore properly dismissed as barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Dopp v. Rask, No. 03-3150, 91 Fed. Appx. 79 (10th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Publication of newspaper article about murder of government informant did not provide his estate notice of a possible claim that the murder was caused by three FBI agents divulging the informant’s identity to members of organized crime, so that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on the estate’s federal civil rights claim. Trial court denies motion to dismiss lawsuit on the basis of statute of limitations, which did not begin to run until the plaintiffs knew or should have known, of both the death and the alleged factual cause of the death. Castucci v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 2d 184 (D. Mass. 2004). [N/R]
While the statute of limitations for an arrestee’s false arrest Fourth Amendment claim would normally start running from the date of the arrest, a federal appeals court rules that if plaintiff was arrested and prosecuted solely on the basis of narcotics “planted” by the arresting officers, the statute would not start to run until the charges were dismissed. Wiley v. City of Chicago, #03-1490, 361 F.3d 994, rehearing denied, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 7456 (7th Cir. 2004). [2004 LR Jun]
Plaintiff in excessive force and false arrest lawsuit against officers was not entitled to an extension of the applicable statute of limitations based on court clerk’s alleged failure to respond to his request about the status of his case, when the case was initially dismissed by the court because of the plaintiff’s failure to pay the filing fee. Summary judgment was properly entered in favor of the defendants when the plaintiff re-filed the case over a year after its dismissal, which was six months after the statute of limitations expired. Campbell v. Kelly, #03-3170, 87 Fed. Appx. 234 (3d Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Statute of limitations barred motorist’s civil rights claim arising out of alleged “high-risk” vehicle stop. Motorist’s motion to extend time to file complaint was timely, but plaintiff failed to have summons to be served with order extending time issued until after limitations period had already expired. Spencer v. Town of Chapel Hill, 290 F. Supp. 2d 655 (M.D.N.C. 2003). [N/R]
Claims which accrued over four years ago based on Native American’s arrest following a “prayer march” were barred by a Nebraska state statute of limitations. Poor Bear v. Nesbitt, 300 F. Supp. 2d 904 (D. Neb. 2004). [N/R]
A three-year statute of limitations under New York state law for alleged constitutional violations in connection with the arrest of a minor did not start to run until the plaintiff turned 18, so that her claim was timely filed, and would not be dismissed. Perez v. County of Nassau, 294 F. Supp. 2d 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). [N/R]
Statute of limitations barred defamation claims brought by grand jury witness against deputy district attorney and county based on statements made to author of book allegedly falsely describing her as a “felony probationer.” The time within which to bring the defamation lawsuit started to run, at the latest, when the book was published and distributed to the public, and was not extended based on the fact that the plaintiff allegedly did not discover that the material was in the book until she subsequently read it. Shively v. Bozanich, No. S094467, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576, 80 P.3d 676 (Cal. 2003). [N/R]
In a lawsuit brought by the family of an man shot and killed by gang members after it was allegedly negligently revealed that he was an FBI informant, the right to bring the lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671-2680, accrued at the latest on the date when family members attended hearings at which the relationship between FBI agents and gang members was revealed and widely reported in the media. Accordingly, the court holds that the lawsuit should be dismissed as time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. McIntyre v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Mass. 2003). [N/R]
Arrestee’s malicious prosecution claim was barred by a one-year statute of limitations for claims against a municipality. The cause of action against the city accrued, and one-year time period began to run when the charges against the arrestee were first “stricken with leave to reinstate,” not when the 160-day time period for reinstating the charges expired. Ferguson v. City of Chicago, #1-02-2463, 795 N.E.2d 984 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2003). [N/R]
Father’s claim that he was falsely imprisoned in his hotel room by police who surrounded it and demanded, without justification, that he release his children, was barred by one-year statute of limitations when he failed to file lawsuit until two years and seven months had elapsed from the incident. Southern v. Jones, No. 2002-CP-01027-COA, 851 So. 2d 395 (Miss. App. 2003). [N/R]
Vehicle owner’s claim for alleged unreasonable seizure of her vehicle accrued, for purposes of a three year statute of limitations on the date that she realized that her vehicle had been seized, rather than a later date when she obtained clear title to the vehicle. Lawsuit was therefore time-barred. Jonker v. Kelley, 268 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 2003). [N/R]
New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations on the filing of a federal civil rights lawsuit began to run on the day that a police officer took his neighbor’s son into custody and to the police station for throwing rocks and dirt into the officer’s swimming pool, even if the plaintiffs did not then know their “legal rights,” since they did know that the incident took place. Simone v. Narducci, 262 F. Supp. 2d 381 (D.N.J. 2003). [N/R]
Arrestee’s civil rights complaint, in restating the legal standard for supervisory liability and then alleging that the supervisor failed to train and supervise officers, was insufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability for officers’ alleged false arrest and malicious prosecution of plaintiff, when there were no facts alleged to show that the defendant police superintendent had notice of the officers’ purported misconduct or to connect his conduct to their actions. Also, as a matter of federal law, the fact that the year that the plaintiff’s claim accrued was a leap year, with 366 rather than 365 days did not entitle him to an extra day to file his complaint to comply with a one-year statute of limitations, when the incident occurred past the month of February. Rodriguez Esteras v. Solivan Diaz, 266 F. Supp. 2d 270 (D. Puerto Rico 2003). [N/R]
In the absence of an express written waiver of the deadline to bring a case to trial within a California statutory five-year time limit, the deadline to do so would not be extended. In this case, the plaintiffs in a civil rights/wrongful death lawsuit over the shooting of their child, in stipulating to a continuation of the trial date to a date within the five year time period did not enter into an agreement with the defendants that extended the deadline beyond the five years. Court also rejects argument that the death of an attorney for a defendant police officer made bringing the plaintiff’s case to trial within the five years “impracticable,” extending the deadline. Lawsuit was properly dismissed, therefore, for failure to bring the case to trial in a timely manner. Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles, No. B157711, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 869 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. 2003). [N/R]
Arrestee’s federal civil rights claims for an alleged unconstitutional stop, arrest, and use of force accrued on the date they occurred, so that his claims were time barred by a two year New Jersey statute of limitations. Wilson v. Healy, No. 02-1862, 63 Fed. Appx. 613 (3rd Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Arrestee’s state law false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims accrued on the date of his arrest and his federal civil rights claim for arrest without probable cause accrued, at the latest, on the date he was sentenced, rather than on the date that his conviction was subsequently invalidated nine years later. Arrestee’s claims were all time-barred under two year Illinois statute of limitations. U.S. Supreme Court decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), holding that a federal civil rights claim for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated did not apply to claims for damages resulting from false arrest not made pursuant to a warrant, the court stated, citing Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2001). Day v. Conwell, 244 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2003). [N/R]
Statute of limitations on former prisoner’s civil rights claim against police officers for allegedly coercing a witness to falsely testify against him in a murder case was not tolled (extended) under Illinois law by either his incarceration or the finding that he had a mental disability for purposes of Social Security benefits (when there was no showing that he was unable to manage his own affairs). Chatmon v. Easton, #02-2377, 56 Fed. Appx. 261 (7th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Statute of limitations started running on billiard hall owner’s federal civil rights claim at the time that a trial court dismissed a prosecution against him for violating an ordinance prohibiting minors from being on his premises. (His lawsuit claimed, among other things, that the application of the ordinance violated equal protection of the law, since it was only enforced against for-profit, privately owned billiard rooms and not against city-owned, public recreation centers). The city, by appealing the dismissal, did not engaged in a “continuing violation” which would toll (extend) the limitations period. Lawsuit was properly dismissed as time-barred. Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleveland, #01-3509, 319 F.3d 853 (6th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Three year statute of limitations for both Maryland state and federal malicious prosecution claims by inmate wrongfully incarcerated for rape and murder started to run on the date that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor, but the claims for false arrest and imprisonment accrued as of the date of the original arrest. Gray v. Maryland, 228 F. Supp. 2d 628 (D. Md. 2002). [N/R]
D.C. statute of limitations on arrestee’s false imprisonment and excessive force claims was not tolled (extended) by his subsequent arrest on unrelated charges two weeks after his release, or by his subsequent imprisonment on those charges. Arrestee actually initially filed a federal civil rights lawsuit over the first incident after the second arrest, but withdrew it, waiting five years to re-file it. Arnold v. District of Columbia, 211 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.D.C. 2002). [N/R]
Plaintiff who settled his excessive force claim against four officers for a small sum 35 years ago, allegedly in exchange for the dropping of criminal charges against him, could not pursue a new lawsuit now on the basis of affidavits from one of the officers recanting his version of the incident and stating that all four officers lied in their testimony. Neither federal nor New York state law provided a basis for extending the statute of limitations. Pearl v. City of Long Beach, #01-7914, 296 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Nov]
Lawsuit for defamation against officer, based on his alleged phone call to arrestee’s employer, was dismissed as time-barred under an Illinois one-year statute of limitations, but the plaintiff was allowed to conduct further discovery to determine the exact date of the alleged call. Stobinske-Sawyer v. Village of Alsip, 188 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 2002). [N/R]
An arrestee had to file his false arrest lawsuit within the applicable two year statute of limitations, despite the fact that the federal court would not have acted on his claim while his state criminal appeal arising out of the same incident was pending, since the cause of action for wrongful arrest accrued at the time of the arrest. Lawsuit filed after two year period was properly dismissed. Nesbitt v. City of Champaign, #01-3163, 34 Fed. Appx. 226 (7th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Arrestee bringing a personal injury action under Mississippi state law against city and police officer was entitled to the benefit of an amendment to the Tort Claims Act, Miss. Code Ann.. Sec. 11-46-11(3), increasing the statute of limitations period which was enacted at a time when the claim was pending, so long as the claim was not already time-barred at the time of the amendment. Tie-Reace Hollingsworth v. City of Laurel, No. 2000-CA-01462-SCT, 808 So. 2d 950 (Miss. 2002). [N/R]
Malicious prosecution claims against officers, based on arrest pursuant to warrant, were not time-barred by Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations since the claims did not accrue until the criminal prosecution was dismissed, rather than at the time of the arrest. Appeals court still upholds dismissal of claims against officers, however, in the absence of any allegation that they played an “essential or influential” role in obtaining the warrant or indictment. Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, No. 99-3688, 239 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2001). [N/R]
Woman’s claim that she had been sexually assaulted by a police officer when she was twelve years old accrued under New York law when she became an adult, so that the statute of limitations on all claims expired three years after she became an adult. Paige v. Police Dept. of City of Schenectady, No. 00-9584, 264 F.3d 197 (2nd Cir. 2001). [N/R]
Plaintiff’s false arrest lawsuit, filed twenty-nine months after his arrest, was not barred by two year statute of limitations, since his right to bring the lawsuit did not accrue until the criminal prosecution against him was dismissed. Pascual v. Matsumura, No. CIV. 99-00706, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (D. Hawaii 2001). [N/R]
345:133 Georgia appeals court rules that false arrest lawsuit was filed within the two year statute of limitations when it was delivered to the court office on the second anniversary of the arrest, but stamped “filed” on the next day. Reese v. City of Atlanta, No. A00A2562, 545 S.E.2d 96 (Ga. App. 2001).
[N/R] Claim for false arrest accrued on the date of the arrest and not on the date the plaintiff was acquitted on the charge for which he was arrested. Laurino v. Tate, #99- 3170, 220 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2000).
331:102 California’s one-year statute of limitations was tolled in federal civil rights lawsuit over search warrant obtained with false statements during the entire pendency of state and federal prosecutions against the arrestee; California tolling statute applied to federal prosecutions despite its language only mentioning proceedings in state court. Harned v. Landahl, 88 F.Supp. 2d 1118 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
333:134 Running of one year statute of limitations to bring a federal civil rights claim over alleged political discrimination in revocation of store’s firearms sales license and raid on store accrued on the day of the raid and a lawsuit filed 23 years after the fact was time barred even if plaintiffs claimed they did not learn the reason for the raid until later. Ramos v. Roman, 83 F.Supp. 2d 233 (D. Puerto Rico 2000).
334:149 False arrest and malicious prosecution claims against officers were time barred under Illinois law when filed more than a year after the time the criminal case against the plaintiff had been dismissed; dismissal with “leave to reinstate” did not, in any event, constitute a final disposition of the case in favor of the criminal defendant, as required to support a malicious prosecution claim. Woodard v. Eubanks, 94 F.Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
326:25 Federal appeals court rules that federal civil rights claim for illegal search of home only accrued after criminal charges against homeowner were dismissed when an award of damages for illegal search would necessarily imply invalidity of any potential conviction; one- year statute of limitations ran from date of dismissal rather than date of search. Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, #98-5451, 182 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 1999).
EDITOR’S NOTE: For other decisions applying the rule in Heck to certain pre-conviction situations, see Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1996) (statute of limitations did not begin to run until plaintiff’s murder conviction was reversed on appeal); and Covington v. City of New York, #96-2026, 171 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999), (agreeing with Third Circuit that Heck rule is applicable to accrual of claims that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a potential conviction on a pending criminal proceeding).
[N/R] Claims for excessive use of force and lack of probable cause for arrest were barred by Massachusetts three-year statute of limitations. Nieves v. McSweeney, 73 F.Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 1999).
[N/R] California statute of limitations on federal civil rights claim was extended as a result of arrestee’s incarceration. Ellis v. City of San Diego, Calif., No. 97- 55649, 176 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 1999).
[N/R] If success on plaintiff’s federal civil rights claim would necessarily have implied the invalidity of any conviction resulting from his arest, then his false arrest claim could not be pursued until after the prosecution against him was dismissed, so that the statute of limitations in New York did not begin to run until that time. Covington v. City of New York, No. 96-2026, 171 F.3d 117 (2nd Cir. 1999).
322:151 Federal appeals court rules that lawsuit over man’s ejection from city council meeting was properly found to be time barred by California one-year statute of limitations; separate statute of limitations, providing up to two years to bring suit when damage claims are first presented to public entity, had no applicability to federal civil rights action. Silva v. Crain, #98-15281, 169 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1999).
320:117 One-year statute of limitations on civil rights false arrest and malicious prosecution claims in California did not begin to run until arrestee’s conviction was overturned, but excessive force claim could have been asserted earlier; excessive force claim therefore was time barred, but false arrest/malicious prosecution claims were not. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, No. 96-55268, 96- 55431, 159 F.3d 374 (9th Cir. 1998).
318:85 Two-year personal injury statute of limitations was correct Illinois statute for federal civil rights claim, rather than five-year “catchall” statute plaintiff in excessive force case argued should be applied. Ashafa v. City of Chicago, #97-2594, 146 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1998).
315:43 Arrestee whose convictions for armed robbery and murder were overturned on appeal because he was arrested without probable cause could not sue arresting officers for malicious prosecution when he did not claim that officers did anything improper to further his prosecution following his arrest. Sneed v. Rybicki, #97-2256, 146 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 1998).
314:23 Two-year statute of limitations applied to false imprisonment lawsuit in Virginia, while one-year statute of limitations applied to defamation claim. Jordan v. Shands, 500 S.E.2d 215 (Va. 1998).
302:20 D.C. Court of Appeals overturns $500,000 excessive force award against District as time barred by one year statute of limitations; arrestee’s release from custody, even if erroneous, started running of one year time period and his rearrest later on other charges did not then extend the time during which he could file his suit. District of Columbia v. Tinker, 691 A.2d 57 (D.C. App. 1997).
306:85 Day on which federal civil rights action accrued because man’s family learned that he was shot and killed by police did not count towards 365-day statute of limitations under Puerto Rican law; the next day was the first day for purposes of calculating the time limit. Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-Cruz, 127 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 1997).
308:120 Two year statute of limitations on malicious prosecution claim began to run when magistrate dismissed case against arrestee, despite the fact that criminal charges against him could have been reinstated during a subsequent four year period; lawsuit brought three years later was time-barred under Georgia law. Waters v. Walton, 483 S.E.2d 133 (Ga. App. 1997).
308:120 Federal appeals court rules that arrestee could have immediately pursued his claims of Fourth Amendment violations in his arrest, the obtaining of his confession (later suppressed), and the alleged use of excessive force against him, and need not wait until his later acquittal; lawsuit filed after retrial and acquittal was therefore time-barred. Gonzalez v. Entress, 133 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 1998).
293:69 Alabama Supreme Court rules that federal civil rights suit against city was barred by two-year state statute of limitations; rejects argument that defendants’ alleged wrongful conduct, causing wrongful arrest and imprisonment of plaintiff, continued during entire period that plaintiff was in jail Jennings v. City of Huntsville, 677 So.2d 228 (Ala 1996).
295:100 Federal civil rights lawsuit over New York officer’s off-duty shooting of resident was barred by state three-year statute of limitations Baker v. New York City, 934 F.Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
298:151 Kansas arrestee’s claim that he was “negligently arrested” 28 days after an arrest warrant was withdrawn was, in “substance”, a false arrest claim barred by a one-year statute of limitations, rather than a negligence claim governed by a twoyear limitations period Brown v. State of Kansas, 927 P.2d 938 (Kan 1996).
298:152 One year statute of limitations on federal civil rights lawsuit in Tennessee began to run on date that shooting by police took place, and expired on the same calendar date one year later Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 1997).
{N/R} Federal civil rights claim based on malicious prosecution did not accrue until after state Supreme Court ordered that murder charges against plaintiff be dismissed Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108 (3rd Cir. 1996).
{N/R} Arrestee’s federal civil rights claim accrued on date of arrest when he claimed warrantless arrest without probable cause; claim did not accrue until criminal prosecution was terminated in arrestee’s favor when he claimed malicious prosecution Brooks v. City of Winston- Salem, 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996).
278:22 Three year statute of limitations began to run on malicious prosecution claim from the time the charges against the plaintiff were finally dismissed, not from the time of the arrest Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d 547 (2nd Cir. 1995). [Cross-reference: Malicious Prosecution]
278:23 California state one-year statute of limitations was extended while plaintiff was a minor; suit filed three years after arrest, but within one year of plaintiff becoming an adult was not time-barred Huntington Park, City of, v. Superior Court (Flores), 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 68 (Cal App. 1995).
281:70 One year statute of limitations did not bar federal civil rights lawsuit over allegedly false arrests with warrants brought more than one year after arrests but less than one year after acquittals; federal appeals court finds suit over alleged unlawful arrests made pursuant to warrants more analogous to malicious prosecution than false arrest claims, and time period did not begin to run until date of acquittals Webb v. Haas, 665 A.2d 1005 (Me 1995). [Cross-reference: Defenses: Qualified (Good- Faith). Immunity]
281:71 State trooper’s alleged fraudulent concealment of the fact that he had seen disabled vehicle at an earlier time and had failed to inspect it defeated two year statute of limitations defense in Maine civil rights lawsuit by estate of deceased motorist; trooper was not entitled to qualified immunity on claim that his alleged “obstruction of justice” in filing false reports deprived estate of decedent of constitutional right of access to courts Webb v. Haas, 665 A.2d 1005 (Me 1995). [Cross-reference: Defenses: Qualified (Good-Faith). Immunity]
282:88 Federal court rules that complaint was filed within the statute of limitations when placed in clerk of the court’s post office box at night on the last day one year statute of limitations would run, despite the fact that the clerk’s office had closed hours earlier; attorney had intended to file complaint before office closed, but his computer printer malfunctioned Turner v. City of Newport, 887 F.Supp. 149 (E.D.Ky 1995).
282:88 Three year statute of limitations applied to civil rights claims against both sheriff and other county employees under Massachusetts law, despite specific state statute specifying four year time period for certain claims against sheriff King v. Sheriff of Franklin County, 38 Mass App. Ct 925, 646 N.E.2d 417 (1995).
286:151 Virginia Supreme Court rules that the absolute maximum time within which the executor of a decedent’s estate must qualify as such and file a civil rights lawsuit on behalf of the estate is three and a half years; executor’s appointment after that time did not “relate back” to validate the filing of a suit after that time had expired Douglas v. Chesterfield County Police Dept, 467 S.E.2d 474 (Va 1996).
{N/R} Complaint was not filed, for statute of limitations period, until clerk of court actually received it, as opposed to date it was mailed or date when incomplete copy of complaint was faxed to clerk McIntosh v. Antonino, 71 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 1995).
265:5 Colorado Supreme Court rules that three-year statute of limitations, rather than one-year statute of limitations, applied to suit against sheriff and sheriff’s deputy for pedestrian’s alleged injuries in accident with vehicle driven by deputy Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo 1994).
265:5 Michigan court holds that pretrial detention in county jail did not constitute “imprisonment” under state statute extending the statute of limitations for lawsuits by prisoners Evans v. Hebert, 513 NW2d 165 (Mich App. 1994).
266:21 Civil rights claim for wrongful conviction and sentence did not begin to accrue until sentence was invalidated; trial court therefore erred in ruling suit was barred by one-year statute of limitations without first determining whether sentence had been invalidated, and if so, when Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera- Cruz, 29 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 1994).
267:38 California statute extending the statute of limitations for filing a civil rights complaint during period of incarceration applied from the time of plaintiff’s arrest through his period of imprisonment after conviction when he had been in continuous custody; federal appeals court reinstates excessive force suit filed by prisoner dismissed by trial court Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994).
267:38 Federal appeals court rules that Utah statute establishing a two-year statute of limitations for federal civil rights cases only would not be applied; four-year “residual” statute of limitations for personal injuries generally applied; legislature could not “usurp” federal law by lowering applicable time for bringing federal civil rights claims only Arnold v. Duchesne County, 26 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1994).
269:70 Arrestee’s civil rights suit over alleged misconduct surrounding a lineup was barred by NY’s three-year statute of limitations Veal v. Geraci, 23 F.3d 722 (2nd Cir. 1994).
270:87 Alabama Supreme Court rules that dismissal of federal civil rights lawsuit as time-barred under statute of limitations did not bar state court lawsuit for false imprisonment, which has a longer statute of limitations under state law Sims v. Geohagan, 641 So.2d 1237 (Ala 1994).
{N/R} Kansas two-year statute of limitations barred claims of constitutional violations by individual state and county officials Oyler v. Finney, 870 F.Supp. 1018 (D.Kan 1994).
Civil rights suit against FBI agent was barred under California four-year statute of limitations Gerritsen v. Consulado General De Mexico, 989 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1993).
Facts in complaint, including prior pursuit of administrative and state court remedy, justified “tolling” or expansion of statute of limitations period under California state law for federal law for federal civil rights lawsuit Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1993).
California law stating that statute of limitations shall be “tolled” or extended on civil damage lawsuit when criminal charges are pending did not apply to civil rights lawsuit against federal law enforcement officers Matthews v. Macanas, 990 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1993).
Arrestee’s pursuing of state habeas corpus remedies tolled or extended the time for bringing a federal civil rights lawsuit under Louisiana state law Burge v. Parish of St Tammany, 996 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff arrestee’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims were barred by Puerto Rico’s state of limitations PerezRuiz v. Crespo- Guillen, 847 F.Supp. 1 (D.Puerto Rico 1993).
Federal appeals court rules that civil rights complaints filed by prisoners acting without attorneys will be considered filed when given to prison authorities for forwarding to a court, rather than when received by the court Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776 (11th Cir. 1993).
DC’s three-year statute of limitations is applicable to federal civil rights lawsuits; woman’s suit against police for alleged warrantless search of her residence, filed almost eight years after incident, was time-barred Rivers v. Montgomery, 842 F.Supp. 1 (DDC 1993).
North Carolina Supreme Court rules that three-year, rather than one-year, statute of limitations applies to lawsuits against police officers for assault and false arrest Fowler v. Valencourt, 435 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. 1993).
Nebraska Supreme Court rules that four-year, rather than two-year, statute of limitations governs suits against officers in that state for actions taken prior to May 13, 1987 Gatewood v. Powell, 511 N.W.2d 159 (Neb App. 1993).
Update: Alabama Supreme Court issues revised opinion, still holding that state’s two-year statute of limitations barred civil rights suit for damages by man whose cash funds were seized by officers arresting him for alleged participation in drug transaction Woods v. Reeves, 628 So.2d 563 (Ala 1993).
Alabama Supreme Court holds that state’s two-year statute of limitations barred civil rights suit for damages by man whose cash funds were seized by officers arresting him for alleged participation in drug transaction; plaintiff was, however, entitled to return of funds because no formal forfeiture proceeding concerning funds was ever instituted Woods v. Reeves, 621 So.2d 672 (Ala 1993). Arrestee’s false arrest civil rights lawsuit, filed after his criminal conviction was reversed on appeal, was barred by New York’s three-year statute of limitations; limitations period was not extended by arrestee’s incarceration, and began to run from the date of his arrest, rather than from the date of the reversal of his conviction Woods v. Candela, 825 F.Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Two-year statute of limitations specifically adopted by Utah legislature to limit time for filing federal civil rights lawsuits in the state applied, rather than four-year general statute of limitations for personal injury claims Arnold v. Duchesne County, 810 F.Supp. 1239 (D.Utah 1993).
Student arrested in 1970 Vietnam war demonstration could sue officer and city for malicious prosecution almost twenty years later when newly discovered photographic evidence resulted in overturning of his prior conviction for assaulting an officer and prosecutor’s dismissal of criminal charges against him; federal civil rights claim, however, was barred by three year statute of limitations Emory v. Logan, 801 F.Supp. 899 (D.Mass 1992).
When California statute of limitations in shooting case did not start to run on state law claims until after administrative complaints were denied, plaintiffs could also wait to bring federal civil rights suit in order to bring state and federal claims at the same time Hood v. City of Los Angeles, 804 F.Supp. 65 (CD Cal 1992).
Negligence lawsuit filed against off-duty police officer for his K-9 dog’s attack on a female child was barred by Colorado statute of limitations when filed more than a year after the incident; dog was only present because of defendant’s capacity as a police officer, so statute limited t claims against police in their official capacity applied Kilewer v. Sopata, 797 F.Supp. 1569 (D.Colo 1992).
Arrestee’s civil rights suit complaining about the search of his residence during his arrest was barred under Alabama’s statute of limitations when filed more than two years after the incident Holland v. Barton, 600 So.2d 233 (Ala 1992).
Pending of criminal proceedings did not toll the New Jersey
statute of limitations for bringing a civil rights lawsuit; filing a precomplaint motion to perpetuate testimony did not serve as functional equivalent of filing a complaint for purposes of statute Byrd v. Manning, 601 A.2d 770 (NJ Super AD 1992).
While Illinois two-year statute of limitations applied to detainee’s civil rights claim of police beating after traffic stop, the limitations period might be extended if officers “affirmatively misled” the plaintiff about their participation in the alleged attack Smith v. City of Chicago Heights, 951 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1992).
Federal appeals court holds that U.S. supreme Court decision on applicable statute of limitations in civil rights cases does not apply retroactively to bar arrestee’s suit against officers for alleged misconduct during arrest McKissick v. Busby, 936 F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1991).
Special NY statute of limitations applying only to suits against municipalities, did not apply to federal civil rights claim; longer general personal injury statute was instead applicable Meiselman v. Richardson, 743 F.Supp. 143 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
Cause of action for false arrest accrued at the time of the arrest, not several years later when arrestee allegedly discovered that arrest was based on computer error; false arrest lawsuit was time-barred Diaz v. Metro-Dade Police Dept, 557 So.2d 608 (Fla App. 1990).
Pre-trial detainee is not “imprisoned” for purposes of tolling Michigan statute of limitations for bringing a federal civil rights suit Jones v. City of Hamtrmck, 905 F.2d 908 (6th Cir. 1990).
Mississippi federal court applies U.S. Supreme Court decision in Owens v. Okure retroactively Flowers v. Dickens, 741 F.Supp. 112 (S.D.Miss 1990).
Federal appeals court reinstates false arrest lawsuit by the “Hillside Strangler” because of state statute tolling the statute of limitations during imprisonment Bianchi v. Bellingham Police Dept, 909 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1990).
Two-year statute of limitations on claims against government bodies, barring claim for alleged negligent and reckless shooting of youth by police officer did not violate equal protection, despite general three-year statute of limitations on all other wrongful death claims Van Wormer v. City of Salem, 788 P.2d 443 (Or 1990).
Mississippi’s six-year residual limitations period, rather than one-year statute for intentional torts, applies to civil rights actions Thomas v. City of New Albany, 901 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1990).
Arrestee’s civil rights claims were barred by Arizona’s two year statute of limitations Krug v. Imbordino, 896 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1990).
New Jersey’s two year limitations period on personal injuries, rather than six year limit on other claims, applies to Section 1983 civil rights suits Cito v. Bridgewater Twp Police Dept, 892 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1989).
Federal appeals courts rule on tolling of Kentucky, Texas and Michigan statutes of limitations during imprisonment Bell v. Cooper, 881 F.2d 257 (6th Cir. 1989); Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1989); Perreault v. Hostetler, 884 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1989).
Illinois two year statute of limitations applies to federal civil rights claims Kalimara v. Illinois Department of Corre

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